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And Yet: Seesaws, Pivots, And Parentheses
(Reflections On Two Voices Of Translation Discourse A Propos Of A
Haiku By Issa)1
Darko Suvin 
Ciadest, McGill University
To George Szanto: 
who went ahead first
The translations confirm, brilliantly,...
that it is impossible to translate.
de Man (74)
Geschrieben steht: “Im Anfang war das Wort!” 
Hier stock ich schon! Wer hilft mir weiter fort?
Ich muss es anders übersetzen, 
Wenn ich vom Geiste recht erleuchtet bin. 
Geschrieben steht: “Im Anfang war der Sinn.”...
...Auf einmal seh ich Rat
Und schreib getrost: Im Anfang war die Tat!
Goethe, Faust I,1 
0. Briefly on Voices, Translating, and Variants 
tsuyu no yo wa The world of dew
tsuyu no yo nagara A world of dew it is indeed
sari nagara And yet, and yet...
(Kobayashi Issa) (tr. Lewis Mackenzie)
0.1. The translation by the highly meritorious Lewis Mackenzie is
for me not fully satisfactory as an English poem. How may one get
to and/or justify an improved translation? Two discussions (at
least) would be necessary for this: a very long and involved
discussion of the micro-level, based on the discourse of rhythm and
phonetics (the network of alliterative and assonant echoes), and a
still complex but briefer discussion of the macro-level, based on
a rapid traversing of syntactics in the direction of semantics. The
final confluence of both these discourses would have to be found,
as always, in the pragmatics between translator/s/ and reader/s/.
I can here only deal with an approach to some points of the second
discourse, drawn in part from some theoretical meditations but
mainly by induction from my translating practice; yet, that very
practice is constantly based on the sensual materiality of
phonetics, on the sound of the poem, which will be invoked at
crucial points.
 
Thus, two voices speak to each other in my head: the
poet-practitioner's, remembering and re-traversing a translation;
the (somewhat unsystematic) theoretician's, attempting to make
sense of that traversing and make it memorable enough for future
guidance (my own and perhaps in some respects a general one). They
often interrupt each other, in parentheses and asides. You, the
reader, are to judge whether this antiphony may be well-braided,
whether this seesaw is pleasurable. 
0.2. Preliminarily, I want to say (as any self-respecting
translator would) that I don't possess—nor am I possessed by—any
fixed rules for translating; I don't know how anybody should
systematically regulate his/her translation process; I only know
(at that, imperfectly) how I translate. In this essay I'm trying to
find out more about it. This is a craft, i.e. an art at least as
much as a science; or, it is tropological, topological, and
associational at least as much as conceptual, linear, and causally
sequential. When I ask the question underlined in 0.1, I'm not
speaking about the actual translation process. I speak about a
critical a posteriori justification of a translation. The kami
(Muse) may be the actual translator; but somebody (ideally, the
translator-secretary to whom the kami dictated) must be able (as
Milton almost said) to justify the ways of kami to people. Blind
beliefs, even into a poetry kami, are dangerous. 
0.3. My final preliminary move is to put forward a few terms which
may somewhat illuminate the towering Babylonian obscurity of some
discussions about variants and invariants in any textual
interpretation, including translation. My position, which I can
here only set out as a hypothesis to be justified by its yield (cf.
Suvin “Weiss's”), is that there is a limit to interpretations (e.g.
translations) but not to uses of a given text. I propose, rather
gingerly, to distinguish between variants (V), adaptations (A), and
rewrites (R). A variant would be a translation preserving the
central structural features (invariants) of the text being
translated; though just what are invariants in a text will often
remain open to dispute, I am not nihilistic enough to doubt that
for given purposes and standpoints this can be ascertained. (For
general epistemological and mnemotechnical reasons, I doubt that
the number of invariants—whose determination is always a concrete
pragmatic negotiation between a historical subject and a historical
object—can be much larger than 7 or much smaller than 3.) Any
translation is therefore a variant. There is no definitive,
absolute or “fully faithful” (never mind “true”) interpretation,
not even when a poet translates herself: the creature is
independent of the creator (indeed, in the wiser East Asian
tradition creations happen either without, or at least through, not
by, creators). This is not to say that for a given purpose and
audience standpoint some translation variant may not become a
definitive one. We can therefore—IF we clearly foreground such a
purpose for a given audience—still merrily go on evaluating and
allotting degrees of “goodness” to a translation. Only the pretence
at a-historical absoluteness will have been well lost. 
An adaptation can be defined as a translation which uses only
some central invariants of a text, but such as are sufficient to
establish its “family likeness” to other members of that family.
The intention of an adaptation is as a rule significantly different
from that of the text being adapted, because the ideal audience has
significantly changed. I have argued, e.g., that one of Arthur
Waley's famous Nô translations is a clear and acknowledged
adaptation, and ought therefore not to be dissected for
philological blame (Suvin, “Use-Value” Section 2). Finally, a
rewrite is no longer, strictly speaking, an interpretation but a
use of some elements from the anterior structure as a semi-finished
product—Brecht's “buying of brass” from a brass instruments'
orchestra, or the medieval Romans' use of the Forum monuments for
lintels of their huts—for a structure of a new kind, belonging to
another “family.” Only a few invariants of the original structure
may be left (at least one must be left, or it is not even a
rewrite), but they are used for a radically differing purpose.
 
For those who like—as I do—the elegance of abbreviated
notation borrowed from mathematics (and without going into the
post-Barthesian realization that all texts are pragmatic constructs
for a given purpose of dissemination, which any student of theatre
always knew!—cf. at least Taylor and Warren), this can be
encapsulated as: 
If a text has n defining invariants, then the range of
invariants in the above cases will be: 
V = n n >A> 1 n–1 >R> 0 
Surprisingly, this would seem to validate a basic logical
distinction between interpretations and translations striving to be
“faithful” (V) and those striving to be “free” (A and R)—but I
suspect that we are here in a semantic trap caused by this
monogamous and monotheistic terminology. One of the advantages of
delving into East Asian cultures is to realize that their matrix is
non-monotheistic, so that this whole problematic can be cheerfully
downplayed in the case of, e.g., Issa. (It ought to be totally
disregarded—but being a European poet painfully liberating himself
from lay monotheism, I am unable to forget it in the present
essay.) 
1. The Syntactic Structure of Issa's Haiku
1.0. To begin with, the classical short Japanese verse forms (tanka
and haiku), incorporating as they do the immemorial and
all-pervasive rhythm of 5+7 (+5+...) breath-units, have the problem
of avoiding monotony, which I believe to have been in good part
responsible for the extinction of the longer chôka form. This
avoidance is a matter of semantic variety, the “Western” student of
poetry might be reasonably inclined to answer. But the history of
the tanka and in particular of the haiku is in fact—at least until
the 19th Century—one of a rather narrow semantic and thematic range
delved into ever more deeply, with ever more subtle nuancing. While
semantics, no doubt, necessarily remain of fundamental import, the
syntactic disposition too grows quite important in such short
forms. They play off against each other a basic—though sometimes
breached—semantic tendency to division into two parts ( rensô,
“association [of semantic domains?]”) vs. a prosodic division into
five (tanka) resp. three (haiku) lines. (This is independent of
calligraphic conventions, e.g. of the fact that the classical
Japanese wrote the haiku predominantly in one vertical line, which
is—to my mind mistakenly—taken by people such as the well-known
translator and critic Hiroaki Sato 2 as an argument for writing
modern, typed haiku in one line, including even English
translations [“Haiku” 6]—which are thereby totally destroyed as
poetry, see 4.1 below.) 
The particular haiku under discussion here is by the great
Issa—the most plebeian and thus the most disputed of the
“canonical” masters (cf. the strictures by Keene 364-69, and Miner,
“Poetry” 428). It can be syntactico-semantically construed in two
complementary ways, which are, simultaneously, divergent and yet
overlapping. 
1.1. The first way is to rearrange the three lines so as to point
out that this poem not only thrives on the tension between
bisection and trisection but it clearly foregrounds, nay flaunts,
the bisection. A different layout can show this: 
Tsuyu no yo wa tsuyu no yo 
nagara sari nagara 
In fact, Issa here takes the structural master-tension of haiku as
a model to replay on a smaller scale in each half of the little
poem, creating double parallelisms in it. Though they are
immediately evident, they may be seen even better in a yet less
orthodox layout:
Tsuyu no yo wa
tsuyu no yo 
nagara sari 
nagara 
This is a kind of seesaw structure, as in the children's
playground device. More, it is a system of seesaws: there is an
overall seesaw with the pivot a pause in the middle, between “yo”
and “nagara,” and there are on top of it two subsidiary seesaw lets
with the pivot in “wa” resp. “sari” (both of them unsemanticized
words, syntactic markers of which only the function can be, mit Ach
und Krach, paraphrased!). Notice how Issa avoids monotony by subtle
variation of breath-unit lengths: 9:0:8 in the overall division,
4:1:4 and 3:2:3 in the subsidiary divisions (it would be fun to
plot this on a graph but I leave that pleasure to the gentle
reader's imagination). This system is so sublimely (and
shamelessly, cheekily) simple, it can be algorithmized: 
If (tsuyu no yo) = A, (nagara) = B, (wa) and (sari) = p
then: A wa A, B sari B; and the notation for the poem would be: 
A (p1) A / B (p2) B (breath units: 4:1:4 + 3:2:3) 
This is what one might call an inversely symmetrical structure, in
which the pivots are specular to each other, as are A and B. 
So: As for A it is A, (yet there is) B; and repeating this
(but again there is) B. 
This little poem can thus (among other things) be read almost
as a foregrounding of Gerard Hopkins's definition of verse as
“speech wholly or partially repeating the same figure of sound”
(189: Issa and Hopkins share a combination of detailed thusness
[haecceitas] and outrageousness). 
1.2. Yet given that “nagara” is—as all Japanese
particles—postpositional, another strong reading of Issa's
syntagmatic flow demands that breaks occur after it, and that
therefore Issa's haiku be read either as two very asymmetrical
units, each ending in “nagara,” or—more reasonably—following the
orthodox 5:7:5 scheme (which in a number of haiku became both
prosodic and semantic, though I don't believe this is the case
here): 
Tsuyu no yo wa
tsuyu no yo nagara 
sari nagara 
A wa
A / B
sari B
The axis of symmetry or mirroring, around which this whole
poem pivots as a door on a hinge, is the pause indicated by my
slash. The poem can be written and read vertically (as it would
have been written in Japanese—though of course usually as a single
line, and if divided into several lines then these run vertical
from right to left) as: 
      ^|A / | B|wa / | sari|A / | B
So: While A is the case indeed, (yet
notwithstanding, there is a non-A); and redoubling
the notwithstanding (there is a non-A).
The part in parenthesis is an unsemanticized but forceful
two-tier syntactic indication of reversal, a kind of
“counter-ellipse” (if I may coin a term), which not only explains
Mackenzie's attempt at the final line but almost enforces a
pause—in Mackenzie the elliptical dots—in any self-respecting
translation. Such a procedure of introducing into the translation
a zero morpheme, as Benvenistean linguists would say (whether the
pause be graphically represented by three dots, a dash, or indeed
an open-ended colon), is a well-known expedient of English haiku
translation practice, stemming from the need to render the impact
of the Japanese  a-semantic kireji words (see 2.3 below). Or it
might be better to widen the meaning of morpheme according to its
root-sense of “shaping element” and call this pause, with its clear
intensificatory (and here also adversative) effect, a shift from
linguistic to paralinguistic morpheme that relies strongly on the
context of a supposed voice, with its intonation etc. Still best it
would be to call this, forsaking the prison-house of linguistics,
a shift from the semantic to the syntactic signifying (here, of a
single sememe). At any rate, the pause is in this poem a parallel
or analogy to the original a-semantic Japanese lexemes discussed.
And truly, if paradoxically, the a-semantic dots are so much more
polysemic than almost any faithful (monosemic or at best bisemic)
translation. (I shall attempt to—partially—break out of the
reliance on dots by a shift or priem almost as outrageous as Issa's
technical tricks: the switch to another language.)
However, alongside its striving for polysemous sentimental
expressivity, classical Japanese poetry often has a clear logical
(and syntactic) structure, “what Japanese refer to as 'reasoning',”
e.g. although/yet (Miner, Introduction 92). Issa's poem is a
variant of this which I would call “absolutist,” since it makes its
point not by logical foregrounding but by logical implication (so
much harder to refute). Its syntactic appositions, more current in
the Japanese, read almost like a paradoxical anti-syllogism or
(personal Amidist rather than public Zen) koan, and I have had to
add “while” to make my point. 
2. The Semantic Structure of Issa's Haiku
2.1. But of course, I am at least half-cheating: the
“notwithstanding” and especially the “non-A” in 1.2 are already not
only syntactics but also semantics. The “cheating”—better, polysemy
—is actually in the original. In it almost every word is tricky,
but in particular “nagara” and “sari.” Of “nagara”'s main meanings
at least two are the coordinative or parallel “at the same time as”
and the adversative “although, however, notwithstanding” (both
similar in some far-off ways to the English “while”). Bashô's haiku
“tsuki hayashi/ kozue wa ame wo/ mochi nagara” (“the moon fleets
fast,/ foliage atop the trees/ holding the rain,” tr. Ueda, Bashô
163) uses it clearly in the first sense of “at the same time
treetops are holding the rain,” though usually a pretended
coordinative use of a really adversative device is a normal
stylistic trick of estranging emphasis. This can be found in
Bashô's immediately following haiku “yase nagara/ wari naki kiku
no/ tsubomi kana” (“emaciated/ yet somehow the chrysanthemums/
begin to bud,” tr. Ueda, ibidem 165), where the “yet” means “yet in
spite of all that.” “Sari”'s main meaning (if this is still the
right term) seems to be syntactic, denoting a referral to what has
already been said, a posture of repetition. (True, very many
Japanese lexemes have homophones—e.g., “yo” means “world,” “night,”
“petal,” and “stalk interval between bamboo nodes,” so that “tsuyu
no yo” is a standard poetico-theological pun involving a dewdrop on
some plant [see the prose passage cited in 2.2], which is however
in Issa's haiku quite recessive; thus, there is at least one
homophone of “sari” that is fully semanticized, but not pertinent
in this context.) “Sari nagara” together, finally, is what I called
above a reduplication of “however, notwithstanding,” emphasizing it
by surplus phonetico- semantic mass as well as repetition; it can
only be translated as a single sememe, and when put into rômaji
script (i.e. Japanese in the Latin alphabet) it can be
transliterated as one word (Keene does so when quoting this very
haiku, 365; cf. also Shimazaki 121, in the Nô play Takasago). 
Thus, while a potentially good beginning, phonetics and syntax by
themselves (the sound and phrase-construction relationships of
parts of a verbal whole) or syntagmatics by themselves (the way a
verbal whole flows through time) are obviously not sufficient. We
need to go on with a semantic discussion: What do A and B above
mean? 
2.2, with a digression on attachment and detachment: I take it that
there is a semantic seesaw and inversion at work here beside (and
validating) the syntactic seesaw and inverted mirror. Simply (since
all great poetry is what we have learned to understand as being
simple, though as a rule it was not simple for its first readers:
its richness is decipherable only after one or more generations of
critical readers have reflected and written on it): 
B = -A
where A = (“Buddhist”) evanescence, B = (“Shinto”)
persistence. 
Why is evanescence in the Japanese cultural context Buddhist
(or better: best formulated in, and subsequently carrying echoes
from, Buddhist texts) and persistence Shintoist (or better: best
formulated in, and subsequently carrying echoes from, Shinto
texts)? I could answer that this needs a long and intricate
exfoliation which would burst the bounds of the present essay.
However—rushing in where Bodhisattvas fear to tread—I shall here at
least glance at what I'd like to offer as Issa's variant of “the
double mood” in the longue durée of Japanese literature—"the
coexistence of two sets of values and attitudes," e.g.: “a Buddhist
negation of passions versus a humanistic affirmation of them”
(Ueda, “Taxonomy” 97); “Shinto renewal and the Buddhist desire to
escape from the world...” (Plutschow 152). 
Simplifying (necessarily, but almost unbearably) the welter of
Japanese Buddhist sects and nuances in more than 1,000 years, I
suggest that the devout Issa would have had impressed upon him some
central features of the Buddhist stance toward life, including
poetry. One of them was traditionally a certain hesitance, if not
strain, when faced with the materialist sensuality of art, seen as
potentially deviant and misleading, thus socio-ethically
transgressive (which is often mistranslated into European languages
as sinful) unless its composition was carried out in the right
spirit—e.g. of teaching the vanity of earthly attachments. One of
the most salient formulations I found for these reflections reads:
One cannot live long in this world; life is more
evanescent than the bubbles on the water or the
dewdrops on a blade of grass. From the depths of my
heart I wish to blot out the sins of my past life
and to become a Buddha in times to come. My hatred
of the world is unceasing. Please teach me to see
the cherry blossoms in Spring and maple leaves in
Fall without feeling their fragrance or enjoying
their hues, and to look upon the morning dew or
evening Moon knowing the transience of the world.
(quoted in Plutschow 164; ibidem ff. and 177ff.
there are many further examples)
True, the fairly obscure poet-priest quoted here went on to
dedicate the above prayer to a famous Shinto shrine; but then the
Shinto-Buddhist institutional complementarity and pragmatic
symbiosis was an ancient, dynamic, and intricate one already in his
far-off medieval time. Nonetheless, the native Shinto structures of
thought had no love for simple one-way evanescence, they were
concerned with repristination (Goethe's stirb und werde). “Japanese
Buddhism formally required one to give up the illusions of this
world in order to gain the eternal reality; this sacrifice was said
to leave [the devout person] with no heart for the things of this
world”; while on the contrary “from [Shintoism] the Japanese
derived a pleasure in their world, a sense of being really at home
in it, that people of few other countries can know” (Miner,
Introduction 106 and 13). 
Now Issa was at that point of the late Edo period a deeply
religious follower of the popular—and thus rather tolerant of
people's everyday interests—Shinshû (True Pure Land) Buddhist sect.
On the one hand, he could sometimes, in his poorer products, give
forth conventional Buddhist opinion just as simplified as the
passage quoted above. E.g.: 
“Tsuyu chiru ya/ musai kono yo ni/ yô nashi to” (in
Henderson 50; improvised translation: A dewdrop
disappears:/ It's dirty, this world, in it/ I have
no business.)
And in the very first prose section, which sets the tone of his
most famous work, the haibun (mixed prose and haiku) poetic diary
for 1819, Ora ga haru, Issa develops at some length the necessity
for teaching and understanding the first and for him obviously the
basic tenet of Buddhism—the transience (mujô) of all things
(adding, characteristically, that he himself is still too caught up
in the “dust of this world”—cf. Yuasa's generally free and not very
useful version of Ora ga haru, 38). Issa's haibun volume is framed
(at beginning and end) and shot through by explicit invocations of
(Amidist) Buddhism. For another, more poetic example: haiku no. 104
in this volume reads: 
“Hasu no ha ni/ kono yo no tsuyu wa/ nagarikeri”
(Dombrady 68, Yuasa's one-sided adaptation 74;
improvised translation: On the flower of the lotus/
It is the dewdrop of this world/ That looks
deformed.)
In orthodox Buddhism “any attachment to this world, even that
of parents for their children, was a threat to salvation, was a
'darkness of the heart' (kokoro no yami)” (Miner, Introduction 14):
the world is at best an illusory way-station and at worst a
disgusting snare on the road to the liberation from the dangerous
passions, in Nirvana. 
Yet the “tsuyu no yo” poem crowns Issa's relating the death of
his favourite little daughter in this volume, in which his love for
her is the central and most important motif. This earthly passion
of his is presented as clearly stronger than (though not
incompatible with) the recurrent religious frame. For historically,
since the 13th Century it was “the peasantry that formed the
nucleus of what came to be known as the True Sect of Pure Land
Buddhism” (Varley 90), because peasants were by their class
situation existentially (though probably not morally) in greatest
need of salvation. Consubstantially with the Amidist believer, Issa
is an observant Japanese peasant deeply attuned to, involved in,
and in sympathy with the immemorial, Shinto-formulated cycle of
rooted seasons and generations. In particular, he is deeply
attached to his native soil and his home (the “ties of
consanguineous...[and] territorial community,” Kato 43; cf.
Dombrady 45). And yet again, this in good part citified poet saw
the village, in another seesaw, as “both the unbearable world of
'greed, evil and selfishness' and at the same time a promise of
safety that he could 'rely on'” (Kato ibid.). 
Such factors led Issa to what I have stenographically termed
the “Buddhist” and “Shintoist” stances toward
impermanence—retreating from the evil versus embracing (as well as
mourning the passing of) the familiar safety of material phenomena;
“in this sense [of life as a creative force] Shinto contrasts
sharply with Buddhism, which takes a darkly pessimistic view of the
world as a place of suffering and misery” (Varley 8). 
Indeed, one could hardly imagine two more different
approaches. Buddhism, with its stress on the
sorrows of the earthly condition, its rejection of
transitory pleasures, its preoccupation with decay
and death, and its offer of release by retirement
from the world and a modification of the human
consciousness, would appear in many ways to be the
very antithesis of Shintoism, whose central themes
are joyful acceptance of the natural world and
gratitude for its bounty, coupled with a horror of
illness and death.... Yet during most of Japan's
history...the relationship between them has been
one of peaceful coexistence—in the proper sense of
the term. (Morris 106)
In a brief overview, where I'm forced to slight their actual
blends and nuances, these stances can be seen as opposite poles on
the same globe: in a Buddhist-derived approach we're well rid of
this dirty world of painful passion, while in a Shinto-derived one
we're to acknowledge perishability only with sadness and longing
for, and an acutely increased sense for the preciousness of, the
terminally threatened or lost people and things. “[A]ttachment even
to one's child risks one's salvation”: even rightly loving the most
endearing things, people lose the chance of Nirvana; and yet such
things “can be truly attractive, and the poet's dilemma is that he
knows and feels the contradiction” (Miner, Introduction 104). 
Nonetheless, “the Japanese sought harmony rather than conflict
between the two religions” (Miner, Introduction 150), and some of
the best Japanese poems have managed to stress the unity of the
globe rather than the opposition of the poles. I'll cite here only
one, by one of the tanka patron-saints of the haiku tradition, the
great 12th-Century poet-priest Saigyô, because this Buddhist lover
of the Moon and cherries provides the antidote to the dogmatic
prose passage cited earlier:
 
(Yet of course, Saigyô too was ambivalent about the transient
world; another tanka of his reads: “If I've truly renounced it,/ I
should show how I abhor/ this troubled world—/ for my sake, cloud
over/ moon of the autumn night!”—transl. B. Watson, 208.)
In sum, “Buddhism brought...a weight of moral law, directed at
man, so heavy that it might overburden his heart....[E]ven a
mother's love for her child was thought by the austere to be an
obstacle to salvation....And yet, and yet—parents will love their
children, men and women fall in love, and life is dear. Buddhism
could be put aside as easily as Christianity, or its happier sides
might be what men chose to look upon.” (Miner, Introduction
150-51). A tanka by the appealing poetess Izumi Shikibu reads: 
Rather than think
That one's life is but the transient dew 
Soon formed and gone, 
Why not fully devote one's mind 
To the chrysanthemum and its long life?
(transl. Earl Miner; in Miner ed. 123) 
Therefore, it has often been argued that the specifically
Japanese Buddhism became “strongly imbued with an [active
behavior]...tied up with its this-worldliness” (Nakamura 367—and
cf. the whole chapter “The Acceptance of Phenomenalism” 350ff.);
that “[t]he Shinto animistic heritage clearly affected the way
Japanese understood Buddhism” (Miner, Poetics 93). A long
tradition, which goes from translations of Bai Juyi through
Saigyô's and Bashô's hesitations, maintained—usually with
“lingering misgivings” (Ueda, Bashô 4)—that the Way of Poetry
(kadô) could be reconciled with the Way of Buddhism (butsudô). And
although Issa has in Japan often been blamed by orthodox Buddhists
for his excessive “softness” or attachment (cf. Stryk xix), he is
firmly in this poetically very fertile tradition. 
2.3. I can here only hint at the intertextuality between the “tsuyu
no yo” haiku and Ora ga haru as a whole (never mind other works by
Issa or similar works by others), and I confess I delved into it
more deeply only after I had done and discussed my translation in
the following sections. Nonetheless, I was pleasantly surprized to
find that tout se tient, that Issa seems to have built the whole
Ora ga haru on a system of balances or seesaws (though I wouldn't
go so far as to call it an “obvious and deliberate opposition
between the sacred and the secular...,” Yuasa 28). This supplies a
historical framework for my point-like intuition. It is a ripe
attempt at happiness in old age; the very first haiku tries to
strike such a balance and indicate the “middle” pivot: “Medetasa
mo/ chûgurai nari/ ora ga haru” (improvised translation: “A
middling happiness/ Is bestowed by/ My new Spring and New Year”—the
beginning of year and of Spring being the same in the lunar
calendar). In this vein, and here surely with full deliberation,
the Amidist framework is in this volume balanced by attachment to
his daughter as center and pivot. The ubiquitous Japanese topos of
the evanescent dewdrop-world (cf. Goff 68 on it and on its twin
yume no yo, world as a dream) is used several times in Issa's
volume. Yet when he reactualizes it, Issa simultaneously (“And yet,
and yet...”) refuses to hate this world, the blossoms and leaves
with their colours, the famous small animals and insects on which
many of his best haiku center (cf. Appendix); and (of course, above
all) he refuses to stop loving, and mourning for, his child. The
height of his attachment is the extraordinary passage in the long
descriptions of prose section 11, which is an apotheosis of little
Satojo. Or, in fact, it is Issa's straightforward substitution for
Amida's Western Paradise or Pure Land—at the rebirth into which the
believer is met by Amida and 25 attendant Bodhisattvas in a
Welcoming Ceremony which was the most popular icon of this religion
(cf. Dombrady 104 and 108-11, Frédéric 197-200, and Varley
66-67)—of the Earthly Paradise of fatherly love: 
...While I was caught up in this enchanting moment,
I fancied that I might see her old enough to dance
with long hair parted in the middle, which would
give me much more joy than the “welcoming music” of
the twenty-five Bodhisattvas.... 
At the same time, and conversely (a seesaw goes up and down,
up and down), Issa's warm sympathy and delight in the small and
weak forms of life fuses with a recognition of their inevitable
lack of stay (the Buddhist hakanasa). In the “tsuyu no yo” haiku
that then follows upon this passage, he sincerely finds refuge and
a measure of peace in a desire for compassionate but cool
Buddhahood. This is the inner reason for the “arrested balance” of
this poem: its peculiar tensile strength, which carries out Bashô's
desideratum for haiku of “a hammered sheet of gold,” is a fusion of
strong detachment and strong attachment (the latter being a ripely
pondered and anguished denial of that no doubt desirable
detachment: “Yet still, yet still...”). 
2.4. The two syntactic structures, skeletons or schemas underlined
in 1.1 and 1.2 translate thus into a first semantic approximation
of: 
“As for the world as [= being in the nature of] (a)
dew(drop), yes it is a world as (a) dew(drop);
while recalling this, at the same time, however - -
-” [or: “yet all the same - - -”] 
And at the same time: 
“It is the case that the world [is in the nature of] (a)
dew(drop); yet while and notwithstanding that [the world
is such,] nonetheless - - - [it is also in some ways
quite other]”
Remarkably (as all my clumsy fill-ins indicate), this is a
verbless poem. While it is frequent for either the third or the
first line in a haiku to be verbless, the oscillating dynamics of
Issa's haiku repose (so far as I can see) entirely upon the
feedback loop between two logically (in Aristotelian logic)
contradictory but in Japanese cultural history richly complementary
stances (standpoints, views, angles of vision). Again, this is Issa
taking to furthest, exasperated limits a general tendency in
Japanese arts and a particular haiku balance. In general, the
principle of ma (very roughly, highly meaningful though apparently
empty interval in music, painting or “between the lines,” the
concave to the convex of explicit expression) means in the
traditionally short Japanese poetic forms something like capturing
the suggestive drift that goes beyond the lines . This is at its
clearest in haiku, which rely almost overwhelmingly on it. The
haiku further adds to the ma principle a dominant relationship and
feedback tension between two semantic domains ( niku isshô = two
parts [make] one whole), which entails changing angles of vision.
As discussed above, this haiku of Issa's certainly practices niku
isshô with a vengeance. At the same time, it epitomizes a tradition
stemming from the medieval tankas in which such suggestive, only
partly conceptual resonances (yojô) were always present and at some
periods elevated to “the supreme consideration of the poet” (Varley
88). As Kamo no Chômei, prominent medieval writer and poet, put it
in his variant on a precept formulated (in Ki no Tsurayuki's
canonic Preface to the Kokinshû) at the dawn of this poetic
tradition :
It is only when many meanings are compressed into a
single word, when the depths of feelings are
exhausted yet not expressed, when an unseen world
hovers in the atmosphere of the poem, when the mean
and common are used to express the elegant, when a
poetic conception of rare beauty is developed to
the fullest extent in a style of surface
simplicity—only then, when the conception is
exalted to the high est degree and “the words are
too few,” will the poem, by expressing, one's
feelings in this way, have the power of moving
Heaven and Earth... (Mumyôshô, cited in Miner,
Introduction 102; cf. Kenkô's famous, equally
canonic passage: “Leaving something incomplete
makes it interesting, and gives one the feeling
there is room for growth,” 70). 
3. Some Practical Looks at Translation Theory: “Faithful”
Translation? “Free” Translation? 
How does one discuss a translation on the above basis? 
3.1. First, Mackenzie's “The world of dew” (or better “This world
of dew”) is awful, I think. I irresistibly associate to a watery
world, something like “the adventures of Alice in a dewdrop” (or,
for Russian readers, the adventures of Karik and Valya; or, for
science-fiction readers, the adventures of James Blish's
miniaturized humans in his story “Surface Tension”). I also
associate it with seeing the macrocosm in the microcosm, a wet
variant of William Blake's “To see the world in a grain of sand.”
That is not at all what Issa's poem is getting at: polytheists
don't foreground the micro/macrocosm metaphor in the way of
Christian Middle Ages. To avoid this, “dew” must be put into the
adjectival position, preceding “world.” This has the further
advantage of enforcing between the long vowel of “dew” and the
semi-vowel beginning of “world” a pause, suitable for the reader's
semantic focusing. 
Second, “tsuyu” must, I believe, be translated as something
like “fleeting dew.” Dew is, of course, evanescent in our climate
too (we would have problems only translating it into Inuit or
perhaps Russian, where it may not evaporate but freeze, and the
cosmology has to use a quite different metaphor). But still dew
doesn't have in English the historical Japanese overtones, it's not
for us a stock epitheton ornans of world, “this dew world.” These
(strongly Buddhist) overtones can be found in almost any writer of
the 1,000 pre-modern years (and indeed after Issa, e.g. in Shiki's
diary for 1899, see Miner ed. 202). To give just the first example
that comes my way, here's the learned Fujiwara Kiyosuke's
12th-Century variation (the latter part of a tanka in his
Fukurozôshi—The Book of Folded Pages), put into the mouth of the
deity Kannon: “The world is but a dew[drop]/ On top of a morning
glory” (Plutschow 176; the morning-glory flower [asagao] is itself
a symbol of transience often associated with dewdrops, and Issa
notes that his little daughter dies “together with the fading of
the asagao”). Obversely, to translate it as a “dew-y” world would
mean “fresh,” “innocent,” and similar sentimental stuff: Rousseau
rather than Dôgen. So I must (paradoxically) strengthen or
undergird the dew's frailty, recall the fleetingness of the dew.
(Another instance of Japanese homophony, the adverbial use of
“tsuyu” in the meaning of “fully, absolutely,” may strengthen my
case.) 
A line reading “This dew world” is too abrupt anyway. Now I
don't necessarily believe (I used to) that English haiku must have
5+7+5 syllables. My disbelief has two good reasons, each of which
would be sufficient: 1/ an English syllable is NOT a Japanese onji
or ji-on (mora, sound or breath unit—cf. Henderson 14-15)—e.g.,
“hakkô” (= publication) would be 2 English syllables but 4 onji
(the first “k” or glottal stop and the macron or vowel prolongation
count as an extra breath-unit each; if I'm allowed an anecdote:
when I was teaching German to the Japanese, “Puppe” was invariably
pronounced as “Pu-pö-pe,” three onji); 2/ an English poem is NOT a
Japanese poem—a fact a number of haiku theoreticians quite
amazingly fail to take into account (and this is not simply a
matter of very different semantics: in English, the logic of rhythm
is quite different, the phonetics richer and more difficult, etc.).
Nonetheless, the line “This dew world” is too short because the two
necessary stresses (I still believe an English haiku should ideally
have 2+3+2 stresses) are not buttressed by sufficient unstressed
phonetic mass—if you wish, the syllable count is too low—without
some addition, some spacing to give rhythmical relief to the harsh
stresses. 
All of this amounts to a procedure of explicating (amplifying,
teasing out presuppositions and transforming them into positions,
cf. Ducrot and Angenot) the original, and could be defended as
orthodox “equivalent” or faithful translation. 
3.2. Most important, there seems to be no literal translation
possible for “B = B.” Lewis Mackenzie has “And yet, and yet...”. In
its antithetic terseness, the “nagara sari-nagara” implies volumes.
E.g. (and just for a beginning): “there is another side, a
complement, to this well-known, and correct, cliché [of 'dew drop
world']”; “there is another side or aspect that balances it.” In
fact, the B=B holds A=A in an arrested and indeed also a mise en
abyme balance—the syntax, the parallelism, vouches for the former,
the semantics of “nagara sari-nagara” for the latter. The seesaw is
locked into a tense or vibrating horizontal position, reaffirmed by
the reduplication. Or: the mirrored inversion, the right-hand
vertical in 1.2, is in its fugitive and implicit but still strongly
suggestive way—enlisting the reader's oriented speculations—just as
powerful as the orthodox left-hand version. It is advisable to
explicate such antithesis in the time-honoured Japanese fashion of
equating syntax and semantics (which is in haiku done by all the
kireji, “cutting words,” or better, pause morphemes and intonation
markers—most frequently kana and ya, but also keri, nu, ran, tsu,
zu...—see the haikus 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11 in the Appendix). In that
sense it would only be going a bit (but not too much) farther to
say “But still it lasts—.” 
This procedure is at the edge of a variant. It may still be
defended as being in the grey zone, or on the borderline, between
faithful translation and adaptation. One could call it a free
translation. Both so-called free and faithful translations I
would—following the doubting of any univocally fixed sense that
informs 0.3—call variants. 
3.3. However, my conclusion would be that in poetry there is no
such thing as an “exact” (in the meaning of one-to-one) translation
(“exact” is a scientistic synonym for the theological-cum-romantic
“faithful”). The line between “faithful” and “free” translation is
thin, permeable, constantly transgressed. In Eco's terms, poetry is
not translated from one dictionary to another (that is an optical
illusion) but from one encyclopedia to another: and the target
encyclopedia is always a contemporary one! 
And yet, the question remains: Even if there may be no exact
translation, is there inexact (faithless) translation? If yes, what
is it? 
4. Further Practical Looks at Translation Theory: What Is
"Fidelity"? What Creative Falsification?
4.1. Any translation I can think of after Mackenzie's has to build
on his strong points and cannibalize them: stealing is the
sincerest flattery in culture. He sensitively noted the
semantically nice English-language nuance between the definite and
indefinite article, but his ear was unsatisfactory. His translation
sounds as if Issa were a somewhat sceptical philosopher, closer to
the Dao de jing than to Bashô. 
By the way, some other well-known translations are in the same
unsatisfactory vein, only more so. E.g.: 
The world of dew is The world of dew
A world of dew...and yet, Is the world of dew,
And yet... And yet...
(Bownas and Thwaite 122; Yuasa 104); and these are among the best
translations. Hiroaki Sato's
“The world of dew is, yes, a world of dew, but even so” 
(Sato and Watson, eds., 399) is, as usual, very correct, but his
mania for translating haiku into a single English line makes this,
as usual, totally unpoetic—just a prose line.3 
Of course such (let me call it) “conceptual” translating is
right, as far as it goes: but it does not go nearly far enough; as
every half-truth, it is the most complete untruth. In analog terms,
Mackenzie might be at 75%; in digital terms, he is at 0 not 1. The
apparently small touch of adding “fleeting” (but nothing is really
small in poetry, and especially in haiku!) might (I hope) remedy
this. 
For, nonetheless, 75% shouldn't just be thrown out. Mackenzie
has nicely shifted the subject-identifying and emphasizing
particle, the determiner “wa” (usually literally translated into
the clumsy but most nearly approximative “as for”) partly into the
interplay of articles and partly into the addition of “indeed.” My
further addition, I trust, suddenly effects a phonetic and rhythmic
valorization of this shift; and whatever is in verse not justified
by phonetico-rhythmic means is unjustified. So I think I have a
translation of the A=A part that—strengthening the nuance between
the definite and indefinite article—ties it into the phonetically
nice agglomeration of dentals and nasals, also of short and long
“i”s (etc.), and that can do: 
This fleeting-dew world Tsuyu no yo wa
A fleeting-dew world, indeed tsuyu no yo 
 
The comma (small pause) before “indeed” is my not quite
satisfactory attempt at suggesting the further seesaw between the
two meanings approximated to at the end of section 2. 
However, just as I didn't like Mackenzie's proposal for the
tricky B=B part, I don't like my first try, “But still it lasts”:
the “but still” sounds a bit too negative (arising out of the
polysemic nature of “still,” which has among other things a
temporal and a causal main meaning, and not quite forgetting the
connotative associations to “unmoving”). If I'm not totally
mistaken about Issa's rich balance, the central stance of this
small but not little poem cannot plump either for evanescence or
for permanence, it can be neither exclusively “Buddhist” nor
“Shintoist.” “But while it lasts...” is more neutral (or, better,
ambiguous, di-semic, two-sided or two-faced), less one-sided. 
Yet at this point I have to face a further, and perhaps final,
important problem of translation: one translates not only from
language to language but also from epoch to asynchronous epoch
(Bloch), from one possible world to another. 
4.2. A digression on season-words: The above is one of the reasons
for my objection to the “season-words” (kigo or kidai—roughly:
overt inclusion of a repertory of elements taken as directly
referring to a season) being treated and enforced as indispensable
in 20th-Century English (or for that matter, 20th-Century Japanese)
haiku. This is not a very new discussion: it was ongoing when in
the 1910s Ogiwara Seisensui, no mean haijin (haiku-poet—and by the
way, editor and biographer of Issa), and his Sôun-magazine group
proclaimed the superfluity of season- words (kidai muyôron) for
Japanese haiku. Nonetheless, in my direct experience it is not only
a majority of the general public but also a large and powerful wing
of the haijin community that still believes in and enforces an
obligatory use of season-words. 
My reason for refusing this is simple: Bashô (and Issa)
wandered on foot through Japan and lived in a hut permeable to
outer air. To the contrary, I don't know which season I'm living
in. That is, I've seen on TV that Fall is coming. My forebrain
knows it but my hindbrain (or whatever you call the part whose
collaboration is indispensable for writing poetry), my kami doesn't
know it. How could it? I use either heating or air-conditioning; I
walk less than a mile per day; I almost always write and read by
electric light. Etc. Now I'm not putting any value-judgements on
this state of affairs. Maybe it means we are alienated from nature,
and our haiku (including our translations) will necessarily be
worse than Bashô's or Issa's. Maybe, on the contrary, it means that
there is no pure “nature” (17th or 19th-Century Japan already
differed quite considerably from medieval or Stone Age Japan), and
obversely that there always is a certain kind of nature which
nostalgic passéistes proclaim as unnatural in comparison to the
former epoch's concept of nature. I myself believe the second
alternative. But whatever we may believe, we cannot write poetry by
fiat from past ages. If season-words come “naturally” (according to
OUR, quite different nature), fine. If not, they are fake
(i.e.—mere conceptualized ideas): and the kami is put to instant
flight by ideological fakery. To make season-words a requirement of
modern haiku (English, or for that matter Japanese), and to say
that a poem answering to all parameters of a haiku but lacking a
season-word should not be called a haiku but, say, a senryû—a
comment I've frequently heard as a poet—, seems to me idealistic in
the bad sense of that term: ahistorical and immaterial. 
As the eminent cultural historian Tsurumi Shinsuke politely
phrased it (in a book whose outline was held as a series of
visiting lectures at McGill University), there is a “disjunction
between pollution and The Book of Seasons” (130)—the popular
19th-Century handbook by Tokizawa Bakin which gave guidelines for
the composition of haiku, classifying poetic subjects for it. As
world politics and economics intermesh more and more closely, this
“disjunction” is most clearly foregrounded for haiku written (in
huge numbers!) outside Japan. A curious footnote to World War Two
ideology is that “[h]ow to apply The Book of Seasons to life in the
occupied territories in the South Sea islands was a matter of
controversy among the haiku poets of the war years”: e.g., one
haijin, a former minister and at the time advisor to Japanese
military administration of Singapore, “argued that each place in
the world has its own book of seasons” (Tsurumi 132)...
All of this means that Issa will most probably write better
about snails and insects than any modern. But any modern will
certainly write better about pesticides and their spoor than Issa:
for the simple reason Issa didn't know of them. Are we to say
snails are within nature but pesticides are not? Where do our
ecological troubles then stem from, if there are no pesticides
within nature? You mean, they ought not to be there. Fine; I
probably agree. But poetry must begin by speaking about what is
there; then it also (more or less implicitly) passes judgement on
what is there. It cannot shut its eyes to anything: not even to
pesticides. Or are you saying there are some poetic and some
“unpoetic,” some high and some low, themes or subjects? Really,
almost 200 years after Wordsworth and Hugo, and 80 years after the
Sôun group; three or four epistemic epochs later? (And after
flowers have begun to be sold from hothouses, year round, on Tokyo
streets?) 
4.3. Back from this digression, I hope not a fruitless one: It may
now be seen why a translation in the 20th Century is necessarily a
20th-Century translation. This is not a tautology : it is the
beginning of all translatory wisdom. Prometheus shoots at Zeus with
rockets today (Zeus still has a superior technology, from
Hephaistos's R&D labs, buried deep under that mountain). “The
inscription of discourse is the transcription of the world”
(Ricoeur 42). How could we “transcribe” any other world except that
of our psychophysical experience? 
Yes but if we've got this far, why stop here? What is
“fidelity”? Fidelity to whom or what? To the author or to the
reader (of one's own times)? It has often been said (e.g. in
Burnshaw's stimulating anthology), but it bears repeating: a
translator of poetry is (also) a poet; or he is nothing at all
(well—maybe a philological annotator for a future poet). Often, she
is a poet who has no independent thematic inspiration (or faculty
of reacting to contemporary stimuli, if you like the scientistic
and dislike the usual theological language—which latter is,
however, not so unfit for talking about the kami). We can find in
any translation a Gadamerian overlap or fusion between, on the one
hand, the horizon of the original time and language and, on the
other hand, the horizon of the translator's time and language. (It
may be well camouflaged—but even the choice of what to translate
gives the camouflage away.) Further, Gadamer's much too neat
picture gets even more heavily skewed towards synchrony by the fact
that our understanding of the original is also a contemporary
understanding (e.g., an English 20th-Century image of Issa as “an
18th-Century Japanese”). Our times are both in us and in the
so-called “originals”: even if we spend half a lifetime learning
Japanese Edo-culture semantics and similar contexts. Strictly
speaking, we can never be the originals. I cannot ever be Issa—or
even an admiring contemporary of Issa. Many great translators have
spent their lives trying to do just such an impossible
impersonation, to slip into la peau d'autrui. Their illusion may
have been psychologically necessary and immensely fruitful: I would
not begrudge them any such prop for their difficult and usually
materially unrewarded labours. But it IS an illusion. History is
real. (Also, reality may be historical.)
Most good translators have known this. Robert Lowell wrote: “I
have tried to write alive English and to do what my authors might
have done if they were writing their poems now and in America”
(xi). He is here consciously echoing Dryden's “Dedication” to the
translation of the Aeneid: "I have endeavoured to make Virgil speak
such English as he would have himself spoken, if he had been born
in England, and in this present age" (2: 228). Such examples could
be almost indefinitely multiplied (cf. v. Koppenfels 145 and
passim).
So, to repeat, fidelity to my (somewhat uncertain)
reconstruction of Issa or fidelity to my quite certain (as certain
as I'm of anything) feeling what is possible to say to (believable,
vraisemblable for) today's reader? I'm not sure I have an answer
for everybody, or even for all occasions when I myself am
translating. But I'd tend to say: fidelity to the author as long as
it is compatible with fidelity to the reader—and no longer. The
latter is my hegemonic convergence point. If I do not reach the
reader, I cannot transmit (any idea I might have of) the author.
Thus, I'd rephrase “Savory's paradox”: “A translation should read
like an original work. — and — A translation should read like a
translation.” (Savory 50), as “A translation should read like an
original work constantly and strongly reminiscent of an earlier
work.” The theory of various anamorphic genres and approaches, such
as—besides play stagings—parody and travesty, would seem to me the
family home for a theory of translation. 
Now today I—meaning not my private civic persona but myself as
my own “ideal reader”—cannot make sense of Issa's neat balances.
(In academic language: my ideal addressee or model reader has after
all the earthquakes of the last 200 years a different standpoint,
stance or Haltung, so that my intention is necessarily in part—but
not totally—different from Issa's [cf. Hönig and Kussmaul; also
Ueda, Bashô 11: “In the final analysis, translation is a form of
literary criticism...”].) Probably, my culture is less balanced
than his: but I am (we are) what I (we) have been made into. “But
while it lasts...” can be mentally completed with “it's
rock-solid.” This is not the only possible complement to the
three-dot ellipse; but it is, I feel, one of the three or four most
probable or strongest possible complements. This is too much of a
certainty for me. It is almost but not quite the exact nuance. I
need something that says something almost identical but just one
nuance less surely (one certainty-sememe less, if you wish). 
I cast about for a long time and couldn't find that. (Of
course, translation problems are centrally problems of ellipse
resolution: how much of the non-dit must I fill in for my reader,
who is a different type of reader than Issa's reader? This is, by
the way, also why I must know everything I possibly can about
Issa's original ideal and real readers: not to translate for her
but to know where to deviate from him.) 
Then I (my kami) remembered the Italian proverb (it's bad
Italian but it's authentic as well as antithetic): finchè dura non
paura, “While it lasts, never fear.” This may be read as the
skeptic flip side of persistence: “as long as it may last, however
long or short that may turn out to be, all is OK and we may enjoy
it.” Sure, it may seem (nay, doubtless it is) commercially or
popularly counterproductive to mix up Italian into an English
translation from Japanese. It may necessitate a footnote; no big
deal 70 years after The Waste Land, perhaps, but not yet quite at
home in translation practice (I don't quite know why—a prejudice;
at least Nabokov, no mean ally, was in favour of it, cf. Störig
XXVIII). But my kami (or do you want to call it “Unconscious”?— it
seems so much less elegant to me) was inflexible: perhaps he or she
remembered Brecht's discussion of how to adapt Shakespeare: reading
sememes in the play and into the play (“[aus dem Stück]
herausgelesen und hineingelesen,” Brecht 16: 888). More
immediately, my kami might have remembered Brecht's poem to the
Theatre Union worker-actors (ah, if Brecht's workers would only be
around to read my translations!): 
...Aber selbst wenn 
Euer Zuschauer, der Arbeiter, zögerte, dann müsstet ihr 
Nicht hinter ihm herlaufen, sondern ihm vorangehen 
Rasch vorangehen, mit weiten Schritten, seiner endlichen Kraft
Unbedingt vertrauend. 
(Brecht 17: 1057) 
...But even if 
Your spectator, the worker, were to hesitate, you'd have to 
Avoid running after him, rather walk in front, 
Walk quickly, with long steps, with absolute confidence 
In her final strength. 
(improvised transl. DS)
Ma finchè dura  it has to be. (Anyway, its scepticism
complements nicely Brecht's utopian “final strength.” Sceptical
utopianism— not at all a bad combination in/for our times. If you
therefore wish to treat the final line as this translator's
adaptation to his own furthest horizons, I'll eagerly agree with
you. But I'll also claim it is in some ways very compatible with
Issa's balance of evanescence and permanence: perhaps it is even
our, lay version of that balance?) 
4.4. Once this overriding need was settled, I began seeing good
reasons for it. It is easy to get to this just by exploiting the
ambiguity of “while” in English: “But while it lasts” (adopted in
4.1 instead of “But still it lasts”): “while” is itself a seesaw
between durative and limitative. And when I got there, it grew
pleasingly polysemic (multi-meaning-ful). E.g. (to do an Empson
pruned by Eco): It may not last very long, but yet while it lasts
it's OK. Can we expect more? Reasonably? Today? In the age of
massive wars against the human body (cancer, AIDS, high explosives,
ads...), the human senses (which, as the Chinese and Japanese knew,
include the mind)? Can't we (“and yet, and yet...”) still make the
best of it while it lasts? Mustn't we carpere diem? At least for a
(this) while? (An almost final parenthesis: I've somehow, without
any apparent cognitive basis—but cf. now Suvin, “Soul”—, always
felt that the ancient Hellenes and particularly Romans had the
European ethos nearest to the Japanese one; and I've always been
happy when I could get a Latin echo into a Japanese translation.)
True, the while may turn out to be brief (as a lifetime?). But yet
it does last (just as a lifetime—or, in Buddhist view, as a brief
kalpa of 144 billion years). 
This procedure is a reversal of the original, anamorphic in
relation to but not hopelessly far from it. It is not simply a
variant translation of but an adaptation of the original. (Yet
anyway, the very significant original is itself a first variant or
version: the demand for “the feel of the original” being, in the
words of the poet and scholar John Hollander, either “a request for
some as yet unspecified version or a demand for the impossible” [in
Brower ed. 231].) 
Thus, “every text is a draft” (Borges 1136). Or, what Derrida
calls (in a wrong quibble, I think) “unreadability”—i.e., the
absence of "a meaning that can be transmitted as such, in its own
unequivocal, translatable identity—does not arrest reading, does
not leave it paralysed...: rather it starts reading and writing and
translation moving again" (116). My modest proposal is thus not a
classical version, it is an e-version of Issa's primal draft. It is
not a full rewrite either. It is not a sub-version, an overthrow of
Issa. As Paul de Man has nicely educed out of Walter Benjamin:
Übersetzen [translation] is associated with another
word that Benjamin constantly uses, the word
überleben, to live beyond your own death in a
sense. The translation belongs not to the life of
the original, the original is already dead, but the
translation belongs to the afterlife of the
original, thus assuming and confirming the death of
the original. (85)
 
The only way to continue the life of a dead artefact or entity
is to give it a second birth, to reincarnate it. The only way
really to understand “is not merely to repeat..., it is to generate
a new event beginning from the text in which the initial event has
been objectified” (Ricoeur 75). We are obviously back at the
theological terms (not because I'm religious but because it's the
vocabulary by means of which some not quite clear matters of macro-
and micro-nature have been most insistently analyzed in human
history so far): I can imagine a reincarnated Issa in today's
climate, having had our (my) experiences, writing this. 
5. So, finally (for now): 
5.1. Is there, then, “inexact” translation? In other words, what
are the limits of allowable translation, the boundaries at which a
translation is no longer acceptable as a translation? The answer
is, in my opinion, twofold—as implied in 0.3. It can be illustrated
by Chesterton's witty quip: “If you feel free to draw a camel
without his [sic] hump, you may find that you are not free to draw
a camel” (quoted in Henderson 69).
There are strict limits to the translation I called a variant:
it must reactualize in its target sociolect all (or almost all) the
central structural parameters of the original; e.g. Tieck's
translation of Shakespeare's Coriolanus. There are somewhat looser
but still clear limits to the translation I called an adaptation
(such as, I hope, this translation by Suvin of Issa): it must
reactualize some (many, most?) of the central structural parameters
or invariants of the original; e.g. Brecht's adaptation of
Coriolanus (cf. Suvin, Brecht). All such translations must draw in
a hump. 
But there are very loose limits for—at an extreme, there is
only one anchoring parameter in—a rewrite: the camel may become a
camelopard (also an animal with four legs and living in Africa).
Charles Marowitz's Hamlet lasts ca. 30 minutes, Edward Bond's Lear
has Cordelia coming to power and turning into a despotic dictator.
We then simply have to judge whether Marowitz or Bond were wise to
try and ride a camelopard, to measure themselves with Shakespeare
(which I take leave to doubt: though I may be as unwise as a poet
when trying to measure myself with Issa; Brecht was usually cannier
than that). 
Further, we have also to decide on a nominating strategy:
Should we call these efforts translations? Does my outrageous third
line “mean” this is not a translation? Maybe it should be called,
say, “lanstration”? Well, perhaps. But if an ass's head instead of
a human's is a translation, then again this one is such too:
“Bottom, thou art translated,” as the Midsummer Night's Dream tells
us. 
5.2. In a book of translations/ adaptations, from this whole
essay—which may be looked at as a kind of variant on Krings's
title: Was im Kopfe eines Übersetzers vorging—only the following
would appear:
 
This fleeting-dew world Tsuyo no yo wa
A fleeting-dew world, indeed tsuyo no yo nagara
Ma finchè dura...* sari nagara
 (Suvin) (Issa)
*But still, as long as it may last... (from the Italian, Finchè
dura non paura). 
This, and some more attempts, can be found in the following
Appendix. 
Notes
1. My thanks go to a Japan Foundation Short-term Fellowship during
which knowledge essential for this essay was acquired; and to Kondô
Tomoko, Yamada Kazuko, and George Szanto. 
2. See e.g. Frogs 136-41. As Professor Ueda's book amply
demonstrates through the reception of Bashô in Japan from the
beginnings until today, the “calligraphic” haiku too was frequently
thought of, by commentators and practitioners alike, as having
three “phrases”; thus, Sato's argument is both poetically and
philologically incorrect. 
3. I have no pretence to compiling a full list of translations of
Issa's “tsuyu no yo” haiku, but three more examples should not be
withheld from the reader. First, the early Victorian-Edwardian one
by Chamberlain (accompanied by a judicious and precise gloss I wish
I had space to reproduce): 
Granted this dewdrop world is but 
A dewdrop world,—this granted yet... ... ... (198)
The second translation attempts to be laconic, and unwittingly
becomes a counterproject: “World of dew?/ Perhaps,/ and yet...”
(Stryk xxii). A real tin-ear horror is the anonymous one (quoted in
Etiemble 39): 
Life is like morning dew 
I know it is so 
But, yet... 
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APPENDIX: D. Suvin, HAIKU MORE OR LESS FREELY FROM ISSA
(with acknowledgement of stimulation & debt to Lewis Mackenzie &
many others)
Quails keep the time Kuina naku 
Of the clouds' quick scudding: hyôshi ni kumo ga 
Look how they scamper! isogu zo yo 
O snail slither on Katatsumuri 
slowly slowly up the slope sorosoro nobore 
of Mountain Fuji. Fuji no yama
Far-off peaks fragment Tô yama no 
Feeding eye facettes & fed: me dama ni utsuru 
Dragonfly flies straight tombo kana 
Happy holiday! Medetô to
Our two cups of sake clink iu mo futari no 
Congratulations. zôni kana
The fleeting-dew world Tsuyu no yo wa
A fleeting-dew world indeed tsuyu no yo nagara
Ma finchè dura... sari nagara 
O mother gone from me Naki-haha ya
I remember the seaside umi miru tabi ni
Yes that seaside day. miru tabi ni
O Fall wind! Akikaze ya
As the span of years lengthens hotoke ni chikaki
Nearer to Nirvana. toshi no hodo
Never mind people: Hito wa iza
In this country even scarecrows sugu na kakashi mo 
Turn crooked, every one! nakari keri 
Not knowing the trunk Kiru ki to wa 
Bears on it marks for cutting shirade ya tori no 
Birds build. su wo tsukuru
Autumn wind— Akikaze ya 
In its whistle there wavers hyoro hyoro yama no 
The mountain-shadow kagebôshi 
Crisp-cold morning Asa samu ya
Last year's pine stands taller matsu wa kyonen no 
My hands are cracked matsu naredo
Winds of Autumn: Aki no kaze
I go trudging on and on, ware wa mairu wa 
To which of the hells? dono jigoku 
On the tide, are you Nanjira mo 
Also seeking happiness, fuku wo matsu ka yo 
Promiscuous birds? ukine tori 
